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I. A PORTRAIT OF HAMP "HELL"
In his 1931 book, The Epic of America, James Truslow Adams
describes the American Dream as:
[t]hat dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and
fuller for everyone. . . . It is not a dream of motor cars and high
wages merely, but a dream of social order in which each man and
each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest stature of which they
are innately capable[.]
To the De La Torres family, home ownership and two beautiful
children were the epitome of the American Dream.2 However, this
dream became a dream deferred: "[W]hen mom Angelica lost her house-
keeping job and dad Angel's hours at a granite company were cut, the
family could no longer afford their mortgage at [6.5%] interest."' Fore-
closure seemed like the only option. The Home Affordable Modification
* Managing Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2014, University of
Miami School of Law; B.A. 2011, University of Miami. I dedicate this paper to Luis R. Paulino
for his unwavering support, his unstinted sacrifice, and his understanding that "[the law] is a
jealous mistress. . . ." Joseph Story, The Value and Importance of Legal Studies, in THE
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 503, 523 (William Story ed. 1972).
1. JAMES TRUSLow ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 214-15 (1931).
2. Bill Whitaker, Homeowners Not Receiving Promised Help, CBS EVENING NEWS (Sept. 9,
2009, 5:51 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/14/eveningnews/main5088036.shtml.
3. Id.
295
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Program ("HAMP") provided the De La Torres family with an alterna-
tive: loan modification.' But when Angel asked the bank to modify his
loan, he was told he could not apply without defaulting on his mortgage
first-a blatant lie. HAMP is designed to apply to any homeowner,
even without a default, if the homeowner is in danger of falling behind
on mortgage payments.6 The De La Torres family's mortgage payments
already consumed fifty-four percent of the family's monthly income.7
Unfortunately, the De La Torres family's story is not unique. Troy
Taliancich faced the same bank stonewalling when he attempted to mod-
ify the loan on his New Orleans home.' After the economic downturn in
2008, Taliancich's business as a computer technician slowed down and
he consequently missed a monthly payment on his home. He called
Bank of America, explained his situation, and was informed of HAMP.
"He sent an application, which contained tax returns, pay stubs and a
hardship letter and was told to expect an official confirmation in 10
days."' In the meantime, Taliancich was told to make reduced payments.
Instead of any confirmation, Taliancich received only mixed signals. He
would call the bank multiple times, each time speaking to a new person;
and each time he was reassured that everything was fine. The next day,
he would receive foreclosure threats in the mail. While the bank contin-
ued to move forward with foreclosing on Taliancich's home, he was at a
standstill. The bank continued to reassure him that making the payments
was "the right thing," but his account showed that he was behind on four
mortgage payments and was not on a trial payment plan."0
While Taliancich's woes occurred in 2008, evidence of the banks'
deceptive tactics has only recently surfaced. As part of a multi-state
class action suit brought on behalf of Bank of America homeowners
who sought a loan modification through HAMP, Bank of America
employees have attested to regularly lying to homeowners seeking loan
modifications, denying their applications for made-up reasons, and being
rewarded for sending homeowners to foreclosure." According .to Wil-
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Home Affordable Modification Program Eligibility, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE.GOV,
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-payments/Pages/hamp.aspx (last updated
June 4, 2012) [hereinafter HAMP Eligibility].
7. Whitaker, supra note 2.
8. Arthur Delaney, One Man's HAMP HELL: 'Just Wait This Thing Out', HUFF POST
BUSINESS (Oct. 14, 2010 12:53PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/14/post_547_n
757979.html.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Paul Kiel, Bank of America Lied to Homeowners and Rewarded Foreclosures, Former
Employees Say, PROPUBLICA (June 14, 2013, 5:44 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/bank-
of-america-lied-to-homeowners-and-rewarded-foreclosures.
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liam Wilson, Jr., a former Bank of America underwriter and manager,
some homeowners were simply denied en mass in a procedure called a
"blitz": "During a blitz, a single team would decline between 600 and
1,500 modification files at a time."12
These stories are snippets of the struggles homeowners face when
attempting to attain a loan modification under the Home Affordable
Modification Program. But what is a homeowner to do? As the bank
continues to move forward with the foreclosure, the homeowner must
turn to the legal system. Through a discussion of influential cases, this
article analyzes whether the fight for fairness in the HAMP arena has
been fruitful for homeowners." This article argues that litigation trends
have only further exposed HAMP's purported "toothlessness," leaving
homeowners with few, if any, options.14 First, however, this article will
attempt to shed some much-needed light on the Home Affordable Modi-
fication Program.
II. UNDERSTANDING HAMP
In February 2009, the Obama Administration introduced the Mak-
ing Home Affordable ("MHA") Program." This program was meant to
stabilize the deteriorating housing market and help homeowners avoid
foreclosure.16 It was projected to help seven to nine million families
refinance or restructure their mortgages." While the MHA provides a
variety of solutions to mitigate the housing crisis, the cornerstone of the
MHA is the Home Affordable Modification Program. HAMP was
designed to "modify [ ] loans to a level that is affordable for borrowers
now and sustainable over the long term."" Under HAMP, banks enter
into contracts, known as Service Participation Agreements, with the
United States Treasury and agree to modify mortgages in a particular
12. Id.
13. See infra Part III.
14. "Next came Obama's 'Home Affordable Modification Program' farce. Another toothless
'voluntary' program, HAMP asked banks to do the same things they've just agreed to under the
robo-signing settlement: allow homeowners who are struggling to refinance and possibly reduce
their principals to reflect the collapse of housing prices in most markets. Voluntary = worthless."
Ted Rall, Another Obama Sellout, YAHOO! NEWS (Feb 23, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/another-
obama-sellout-203011832.html.
15. MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS OF NON-GSE
MORTGAGES 13 (Version 4.1 2012), available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/
docs/hamp-servicer/mhahandbook 41.pdf [hereinafter MHA HANDBOOK].
16. Id.
17. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Home Mortgage Crisis (Feb.
18, 2009), in Archive of President Obama's Speeches & Remarks, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-mortgage-crisis.
18. Fannie Mae, Home Affordable Modification Program: Overview, MAKING HOME
AFFORDABLE, https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/hamp.jsp#1 (last visited Feb. 2. 2013).
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and uniform fashion.1 9 In return, the Federal Government gives the
banks incentive payments. 2 0 To date, there are over one hundred partici-
pating servicers, including all major banks.2 '
HAMP applies to homeowners who (1) received their mortgage on
or before January 1, 2009; (2) owe up to $729,750 on their primary
residence; (3) acknowledge that the property is not condemned; (4)
experience financial hardship and are either delinquent or in danger of
falling behind on mortgage payments; (5) have evidence of income to
support a modified payment; and (6) have not been convicted within the
last ten years of specific crimes generally connected to mortgage or real
estate transactions.2 2 The program also applies to those who own rental
property and owe up to a specific monetary amount. 23 The homeowner
must meet all criteria in order to be considered for a HAMP loan
modification.2 4
The beauty of HAMP is that it forces banks to calculate loan modi-
fications uniformly.25 HAMP's goal is to reduce the borrower's monthly
mortgage payment to below thirty-one percent of the borrower's
income. 2 6 The uniform criteria, also referred to as the "waterfall" calcu-
19. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 21; see also Purchase Financial Instrument and
Servicer Participation Agreement, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE https://www.hmpadmin.com/
portal/programs/docs/hamp-servicer/servicerparticipationagreement.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2013)
[hereinafter Service Participation Agreement].
20. [T]he lien-holder will receive a $1500 payment for modifying current borrowers
who are at imminent risk of default and may receive a home price decline protection
payment. Servicers receive $1000 when a loan modification completes its trial plan,
fulfills its documentation requirements, and becomes permanent; if the modification
continues to perform, the servicer is eligible for an additional $1000 on each of the
first three anniversaries of the modification as well as additional incentives for
modifying imminent default borrowers. Homeowners are eligible for up to five one-
time payments toward principal reduction equal to $1000 each year if they make
their payments on time.
Steven Holden et al., The HAMP NPV Model: Development and Early Performance 4-5 (Fed.
Hous. Fin. Agency, Working Paper No. 11-1, 2011) available at http://www.fifa.gov/webfiles/
21680/REEHAMP_07-22-11_FINAL.pdf; see also MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 134-39
for specific criteria as to how loan servicers, investors, and mortgagees receive incentives from the
federal government through HAMP.
21. See Contact Your Mortgage Company, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE.GOv http://www.
makinghomeaffordable.gov/get-assistance/contact-mortgage/Pages/default.aspx (last updated
Aug. 4, 2011 3:19 PM) (providing a list of mortgage companies that participate in HAMP).
22. See HAMP Eligibility, supra note 6.
23. Specifically, rental property is eligible for HAMP loan modification if the homeowner
owes up to $729,750 on a single unit rental property; $934,200 on a 2-unit rental property;
$1,129,250 on a 3-unit rental property; or $1,403,400 on a 4-unit rental property. Id.
24. See MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 68-75.
25. See MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 100-13.
26. "The program strives to create a more affordable first lien housing payment of principal,
interest, taxes, insurance, homeowner/condo association fees, and escrow shortages that is as close
as possible, but no less than, [thirty-one] percent of the borrower's gross monthly household
298 [Vol. 68:295
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lation dictate the refinancing terms of the loan modification. 2 7 By plac-
ing strict criteria on the way banks provide loan modifications, this goal
is fulfilled.2 8 If the homeowner's mortgage payment is already below
thirty-one percent, he is not eligible for the traditional Tier 1 HAMP, but
can apply for the more stringent requirements of Tier 2.29
Homeowners can be denied eligibility if the mortgage investor
would make more money by allowing the subject property to go into
foreclosure than by approving a loan modification.3 0 This decision is
made through the use of a mathematical formula called the Net Present
Value ("NPV") test." The "NPV formula takes into account various
foreclosure factors such as the current property value, foreclosure costs,
and the expected resale time, and compares them with various modifica-
tion factors such as the value of the modified monthly payment and the
risk of a repeat default."3 2 May 2010 data from the U.S. Department of
the Treasury show that an estimated 300,000 loans are eliminated each
month from HAMP eligibility based on the NPV calculation.
Once the mortgagor has decided that a loan modification would be
more beneficial, the homeowner is placed on a Trial Period Plan
("TPP"). The TPP mirrors an estimate of what the mortgage payments
would be if the loan were approved based on the calculated modification
income." FREDDIE MAC, HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, PUB. No. 800 1 (2012)
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/service/factsheets/pdf/mha-modification.pdf.
27. Id.
28. The borrower's mortgage payment is reduced to thirty-one percent of his "income through
a uniform sequence of three steps (hereafter referred to as the modification 'waterfall'). The
waterfall consists of: (1) a rate reduction to as low as two percent; (2) if necessary, a term
extension up to forty years; and (3) as necessary, principal forbearance ..... This rate continues
for five years. After five years, the interest rate increases one percentage point per year until it
reaches a fixed cap set forth in Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS). See
Steven Holden et al., The HAMP NPV Model: Development and Early Performance 4-5 (Fed.
Hous. Fin. Agency, Working Paper No. 11-1, 2011) available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/
21680/REEHAMP_07-22-11_FINAL.pdf.
29. See MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 101. A more in-depth discussion of the
differences in eligibility for Tier I and Tier 2 can be found in the MHA HANDBOOK, supra note
15, at 68-71.
30. See John R. Chiles & Matthew T. Mitchell, HAMP: An Overview of the Program and
Recent Litigation Trends, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 194, 196 (2011).
3 1. Id.
32. Id.; see MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 113-17 for a more comprehensive
understanding of the NPV test.
33. See MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
SERVICER PARTICIPATION REPORT THROUGH MAY 2010, at 7 (2012), available at http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/November%202012%20MHA%20
Report%20Final.pdf. Data after this date do not show the amount of homeowners eliminated from
HAMP eligibility based on the NPV test. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, Making Home
Affordable Performance Report, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Pages/Making-Home-Affordable-Program-Performance-Report.aspx (last updated
July 13, 2012, 4:41 PM).
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in the "waterfall" stage.34 The trial period is generally three months.35
According to the MHA handbook, "[b]orrowers who make all trial
period payments timely and who satisfy all other trial period require-
ments will be offered a permanent modification."3 6
III. LESSONS FROM HAMP: WHERE DID THINGs Go WRONG?
The road to attain a HAMP loan modification appears straightfor-
ward; however, this road does not parallel the real life experiences of
many homeowners frustrated with their attempts to attain HAMP help.
Perhaps an erroneous foreclosure on one house is not a significant blun-
der in comparison to the estimated 1.1 million homeowners who have
received a permanent loan modification in HAMP's three-year stint.
But to families like the De La Torres', the loss of their home is not a
mere blunder." Many homeowners attempt to fight the battle for their
home in the courtroom-only to find themselves with a hefty legal bill
and without any legal remedies. Various creative causes of action for
HAMP violations have been brought in front of courts nationwide; these
causes of action include due process violations, private right of actions,
contractual remedies, consumer protection actions, and class actions.
Other than an anomaly out of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
each posited legal remedy has largely failed. The court's inability to find
a way for homeowners to redress the bank's errors further demonstrates
that HAMP is no more than a federal handout to banks.
A. Homeowners Have No Due Process Rights Under HAMP
Johnson Sendolo purchased his home in 2005. Three years later he
was laid off and could not make his mortgage payments.40 Sendolo
sought a loan modification under HAMP through his loan servicer. His
request was denied. Subsequently, his house was foreclosed upon and
34. See MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 118.
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH NOVEMBER 2012 at 1
(2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/
November%202012%20MHA%2OReport%20Final.pdf.
38. Whitaker, supra note 2.
39. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that a
borrower's causes of action under state law remedies were valid). The implications of the Wigod
decision are discussed later in the article.
40. Williams v. Geithner, CIV.09-1959 ADMIJJG, 2009 WL 3757380 (D. Minn. Nov. 9,
2009). In addition to Sendolo, Williams was also a plaintiff in this case. Id. at *4. Both "purport[ ]
to represent a class of people who are delinquent on their mortgage payments, have applied for
and been denied a loan modification, and whose homes have been sold at a foreclosure sale and
whose statutory right of redemption period has not yet expired." Id.
300 [Vol. 68:295
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sold at a sheriffs sale. He was informed that he had six months to pay
the loan balance in full; otherwise, he would lose the property forever.
With few options left, Sendolo pursued an injunction. He alleged that
the denial of his loan modification was a violation of his constitutional
right to procedural due process: According to Sendolo, the bank's "fail-
ure to provide written notification of an adverse decision and an oppor-
tunity for appeal deprive[d] [Sendolo] of due process . . . ."41 Sendolo's
due process claim is not a rare case; multiple federal district courts have
considered this issue as well.42
Unfortunately, no court has found a due process entitlement for eli-
gible HAMP borrowers.4 3 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment forbids the Federal Government from depriving persons of "life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."" Sendolo contended
that he had a protected property interest in attaining a HAMP loan modi-
fication.4 5 A protected property interest exists when a person has "more
than an abstract need or desire for [a benefit]. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it."4 6 Thus, "[t]he question is not simply whether there is
an expectation of certain government treatment, but whether the individ-
ual has an enforceable right to that treatment."4 7
Courts have found that eligible homeowners do not have a property
interest in attaining a HAMP modification for two reasons: First, there is
no absolute duty placed on the Federal Government or loan services by
the congressional statute that establishes HAMP, the Treasury Guide-
lines, or the Service Participation Agreements.4 8 To the contrary, all of
41. Id. at *4.
42. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(holding that a loan modification does not establish a constitutionally protected property interest
pursuant to the EESA and HAMP); McInroy v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, No. CIV. 10-
4342 DSD/SER, 2011 WL 1770947 (D. Minn. May 9, 2011) (same); Steffens v. Am. Home
Mortg. Sevicing, Inc., No. 6:10-1788-JMC, 2011 WL 901812 (D.S.C. Jan. 5, 2011) report and
recommendation adopted sub nom., C.A. 6: 10-cv-01788-JMC, 2011 WL 901179 (D.S.C. Mar. 15,
2011) (same); Orcilla v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C1O-03931 HRL, 2010 WL 5211507 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 16, 2010) (same); Nguyen v. BAC Home Loan Services, L.P., No. C-10-01712 RMW, 2010
WL 3894986 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (same).
43. As of this article's publication, no court has found a due process violation under HAMP.
See supra, note 42. However, some courts, like the court in Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
have decided not to address the issue because the breach of contract action is independent of any
purported property interest. See 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 350-51 (D. Mass. 2011).
44. U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
45. Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *5.
46. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
47. Edwards, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 153 (citing Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S 748,
757 (2005)).
48. Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *5.
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these documents are fraught with discretionary powers.4 9 The statute
establishing HAMP, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
("EESA"), does not require loans to be modified; instead, it states that a
loan may be modified "where appropriate." 0 The United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota in Williams v. Geithner found that
the phrase-"where appropriate"-"limits the Secretary's obligation
and evinces a [c]ongressional intent to afford discretion in the decision
whether to modify loans in certain circumstances."s" The Treasury
guidelines grant additional discretion to the loan servicers: "While ...
the NPV calculation is merely an objective mathematical formula,
assigning values to certain variables within the formula are largely
within each servicer's discretion . . . ."52 Furthermore, the Service Par-
ticipation Agreements grant loan servicers considerable discretion over
which loans to modify." The lack of any "language of an unmistakably
mandatory character" in the EESA, the guidelines, or the SPAs under-
mines a claim of due process entitlement.54
Secondly, even if the HAMP Treasury guidelines were compulsory,
compulsion would not create a protected property interest." In Edwards
v. Aurora Loan Services, the court followed the Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia's holding that only statutes and regulations, and not
guidelines, could create a constitutionally protected entitlement. 6
Because "HAMP eligibility requirements are neither codified by Con-
gress nor promulgated by [the] Treasury through notice-and-comment
rulemaking," the guidelines are not a protected property interest.57 The
near-universal finding that eligible borrowers do not have a property
interest in the loan modification leaves homeowners, like Sendolo, claw-
ing for other options.
49. Id.
50. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5219 (2012).
51. Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *6.
52. Id.
53. See Edwards v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 144, 151 (D.D.C. 2011).
54. Williams, 2009 WL 3757380, at *6 (citing Hill v. Group Three Housing Development
Corp., 799 F.2d 385, 392 (8th Cir. 1986) (describing rules or understandings that may create a
protected property interest if there is clear mandatory language) (citation omitted)).
55. See Edwards, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 154.
56. See id. (citing Wash. Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 32 (D.C. Cir.
1997)). The D.C. Circuit pointed out that although employment contracts may create a property
entitlement, "we have found no decision of the Supreme Court or this Circuit holding that
administrative rules or understandings existing wholly apart from legislation or regulations may
create a property interest." Wash. Legal Clinic for the Homeless, 107 F.3d at 38.
57. See Edwards, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 154.
58. Nicholas Maxwell provides an interesting critique of the Williams decision. See Nicholas
T. Maxwell, Note, The 75 Billion Dollar Question: Why is HAMP Not An Entitlement Program?,
97 IOWA L. R. 1305 (2012).
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B. Homeowners Are Not Third-Party Beneficiaries to the Service
Participation Agreement
Disgruntled homeowners who fail to attain HAMP modifications
have argued that they are entitled to a permanent loan modification
because they are third-party beneficiaries of the Service Participation
Agreement ("SPA")." The SPA is a contract executed between a loan
servicer and the Federal Government in order to give teeth to HAMP.60
It spells out the actions that the loan servicers must take, such as the use
of the waterfall calculation or the NPV formula, in order to receive the
monetary incentive from the U.S. Treasury.61 At least three notable
cases have found success under this litigation theory;6 2 however, a vast
majority of courts have rejected it.63
To establish that homeowners are third-party beneficiaries of the
SPAs, homeowners must prove, either by the intent of the contracting
parties or by the SPA's language, that the banks intended to make them
beneficiaries.' The requirement of establishing clear intent derives from
the fear that third parties, who may be only incidental beneficiaries, will
unnecessarily bring lawsuits: "Government contracts by their nature
benefit the public, but only in rare circumstances will courts deem indi-
59. See, e.g., Speleos v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 755 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass.
Dec. 14, 2010).
60. See Service Participation Agreement, supra note 19.
6 1. Id.
62. See Sampson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. CV 10-08836 DDP (SSx), 2010 WL
5397236 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); Marques v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 09-CV-1985-
L(RBB), 2010 WL 3212131 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010); Reyes v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., No.
09cvl366 DMS (WMC), 2009 WL 3738177 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009).
63. See, e.g., Gale v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. 1:11-CV-47 TS, 2011 WL 1897671 (D. Utah
May 18, 2011); Nafso v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 11-10478, 2011 WL 1575372 (E.D. Mich.
April 26, 2011); Grill v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, CIV No. 10-CV-03057-FCD/GGH,
2011 WL 127891 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2011); Orcilla v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C10-03931 HRL,
2010 WL 5211507 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2010); Martinez v. Bank of Am. Nat'1 Ass'n., No. 3:10-cv-
00287-RCJ-RAM, 2010 WL 4290921 (D. Nev. Oct. 20, 2010); Zoher v. Chase Home Fin., No.
10-14135-CIV, 2010 WL 4064798 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2010); Phu Van Nguyen v. BAC Home
Loan Servs., LP, No. C-10-01712 RMW, 2010 WL 3894986 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010); Hammonds
v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. EDCV 10-1025 AG (OPx), 2010 WL 3859069 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
27, 2010); McKensi v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 09-11940-JGD, 2010 WL 3781841 (D. Mass.
Sept. 22, 2010); Vazquez v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, No. 2:10-CV-001 16-PMP-RJJ, 2010 WL
3385350 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2010); Zeller v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. 3:10cv00044, 2010
WL 3219134 (W.D. Va. Aug. 10, 2010); Wright v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV 10-01723 JF
(HRL), 2010 WL 2889117 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010); Hoffman v. Bank of Am. N.A., No. C 10-
2171 SI, 2010 WL 2635773 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2010); Zendejas v. GMAC Wholesale Mortg.
Corp., No. 1:10-CV-00184 OWW GSA, 2010 WL 2490975 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2010); Benito v.
Indymac Mortg. Servs., No. 2:09-CV-001218-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 2130648 (D. Nev. May 21,
2010); Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09cvl557 BTM(BLM), 2009 WL
4981618 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009).
64. See Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *3 (citing Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc.,
588 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) rev'd on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 1342 (2011)).
3032013]
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vidual members of the public to be intended beneficiaries empowered to
enforce those contracts in court."65
Courts have viewed the issue of intent differently. 6 At least three
courts, like the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California in Marques v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, found clear
intent that eligible homeowners were the intended beneficiaries of the
SPAs. 67 By examining the SPA as a whole, the Marques Court stated
that the requirements placed on the banks demonstrated no other dis-
cernable purpose for the SPA except to provide loan modifications for
the benefit of eligible HAMP borrowers.6 8 Moreover, the SPA's purpose
coincides with the U.S. Treasury's descriptions of the program: HAMP
"will help up to 3 to 4 million at-risk homeowners avoid foreclosure by
reducing monthly mortgage payments." 69 The Marques Court's holistic
view of the SPA allowed for the homeowner to have standing to sue as a
third-party beneficiary.7 0
However, an overwhelming majority of district courts have found
that SPAs lack clear intent to make eligible homeowners third-party ben-
eficiaries." In Edwards v. Aurora Loan Services, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia focused on the wording of the
Service Participation Agreement: The SPA "shall inure72 to the benefit
of the parties to the Agreement and their permitted successors-in-inter-
est."7 Eligible homeowners of HAMP were not expressly included as
contemplated successors.7 4 Because the SPA specifically identified who
was entitled to benefit from the agreement, such borrowers were not
third-party beneficiaries." Additionally, as other courts have empha-
sized, the fact that the SPAs would undoubtedly benefit the borrowers
65. Edwards, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 151 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 313(2) cmt. a ("Government contracts often benefit the public, but individual members of the
public are treated as incidental beneficiaries unless a different intention is manifested.") (1981)).
66. Compare Speleos v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 755 F. Supp. 2d 304, 304 (D.
Mass. Dec. 14, 2010) and Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *1 with Edwards, 791 F. Supp. 2d at
141.
67. See Marques, 2010 WL 3212131, at *4.
68. Id. at *5.
69. Id. at *6.
70. Id. at *7. However, the Motion to Dismiss was ultimately granted in favor of Wells Fargo
because Marques "ha[d] alleged insufficient facts to state a claim for breach of the Agreement."
Id.
71. See supra note 63.
72. The language of the SPA and the Trial Period Plan is often times complex legal jargon
that only sophisticated attorneys can comprehend.
73. See Edwards v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 144, 151 (D.D.C. 2011).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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only demonstrates the incidental purpose of the SPAs.76 Without a clear
demonstration to the contrary, the presumption that borrowers are inci-
dental beneficiaries remains." The final nail in the third-party benefici-
ary coffin was the borrower's unreasonable reliance on the SPA as a
means to enforce his rights." The Edwards Court found that the SPA
gave loan servicers and the Federal Government significant discretion
such as the Treasury's ability to define HAMP criteria and the banks
broad decision-making in deciding which loans to modify." Such
expansive discretion meant that borrowers were unable to reasonably
rely on the SPA to determine what constituted a violation of the
agreement.so
While the Marques and Edwards Courts provide two extreme
views on the third-party beneficiary issue, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts took the middle road."' In
Speleos v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, the court attempted to reconcile
the blatant purpose of HAMP-to help homeowners refinance their
mortgage at reasonable rates-with the narrow limitations found in the
Service Participation Agreement.82 The Speleos court found that HAMP-
eligible borrowers are intended third-party beneficiaries because the pri-
mary purpose of the SPAs was to benefit this class of individuals. Like
the passengers in an aircraft crash who successfully sued a municipality
as third-party beneficiaries to the municipality's contract with the Fed-
eral Government, the SPAs were intended to benefit eligible homeown-
ers." However, this supposed intent of the SPA and HAMP guidelines
is undermined by the clear terms of the contract.8 4 Similar to the argu-
ment made in Edwards, the Speleos Court found that the SPA's lan-
guage specifically limited who the beneficiaries were and did not
include eligible homeowners." Thus, "[t]he Plaintiffs' third-party
breach-of-contract claim against BAC is . .. precluded."86
The near-uniform consensus by district courts across the United
76. See Hoffman v. Bank of Am. N.A., No. C 10-2171 S1, 2010 WL 2635773, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. June 30, 2010).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Edwards, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 151-52.
80. See Hoffman, 2010 WL 2635773, at *4.
81. See Speleos v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 755 F. Supp. 2d 304, 304 (D. Mass.
Dec. 14, 2010).
82. Id. at 309-10.
83. Id. at 309 (quoting Miree v. DeKalb Cnty., 433 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1977)).
84. Id. at 310.
85. "Section XIV, the 'Severability and Enforcement' clause of the [Service Participation
Agreement] provides that: 'These rights and remedies are for our benefit and that of our
successors and assigns."' Id. (internal citation omitted).
86. Id.
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States has generally foreclosed the theory that eligible HAMP borrowers
are third-party beneficiaries of the Service Participation Agreement.
Without the ability to sue for HAMP violations as beneficiaries of the
contract between the loan servicers and the banks, homeowners
attempted to sue the banks for breaching the terms of the Trial Period
Plan.
C. HAMP Does Not Provide an Express or Implied Private
Right of Action
In Miller v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals was asked to determine whether a private right of action
existed under HAMP." Miller, a homeowner from Hiawassee, Georgia,
requested a loan modification after citing financial difficulties in paying
his mortgage." His bank, Chase Home Financing, agreed to place Miller
on a trial payment plan.8 1 Six months later, Miller was denied a perma-
nent loan modification. 90 Miller sued, arguing that Chase failed to
adhere to its obligations under HAMP when it denied him a permanent
loan modification." The court found that HAMP provides for no private
right of action, either implicitly or explicitly.92 Therefore, Miller did not
have standing to bring his claims before the court.9
The Eleventh Circuit solidified what a large majority of lower
courts have also held: The lack of any express wording allowing bor-
rowers to sue loan servicers in HAMP guidelines or statutes meant that
borrowers were without any remedies.94 Additionally, the court ruled
that no implied private right of action existed.95 The court analyzed Con-
gress's intent when it created HAMP. 6 It determined that HAMP was
designed to "restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the
United States," not to specially benefit struggling homeowners.9 7 This
view is bolstered by Congress's decision to place the power to initiate a
87. See Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1115 (11th Cir. 2012).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 2:10-CV-206-WCO, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
154800 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2011).
91. Miller, 677 F.3d at 1116.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.; accord Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10 CV 2348, 2011 WL 250501, at *4
(N.D. 111. Jan. 25, 2011); See, e.g., Phipps v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV F 10-2025 LJO
SKO, 2011 WL 302803, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011) (finding no private right of action under
HAMP); Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., Civ. No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5 (D. Or.
Dec. 13, 2010) (same).
95. See Miller, 677 F.3d at 1116.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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lawsuit against banks in the hands of the Secretary as well as the fact
that allowing private citizens to sue mortgage servicers would likely sti-
fle the purpose of HAMP."8 Moreover, the court stated that in order for
Miller to succeed in redressing his grievances, he would have to allege
claims independent of Chase's obligations under HAMP. 99 The absence
of any indication that Congress intended to allow for borrowers to sue
banks over HAMP violations meant that Miller's grievances could not
be heard in court.'
D. State-Law Claims May Exist Without a Private Right of Action
Until April 2012, "[c]ourts have universally rejected . . . claims
[like Miller's] on the ground that HAMP does not create a private right
of action for borrowers against lenders and servicers." 01 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals revolutionized the legal approach to HAMP. In
its decision, Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the Seventh Circuit
placed a new twist on whether state contract remedies could be applied
to HAMP violations. 10 2
Lori Wigod filed a seven-count complaint against her mortgage ser-
vicer, Wells Fargo, after she was denied a permanent loan modification.
Wigod entered into a HAMP Trial Period Plan with Wells Fargo in mid-
May 2009. The TPP stated: "I understand that after I sign and return two
copies of this Plan to the Lender, the Lender will send me a signed copy
of this Plan if I qualify for the [permanent modification] Offer or will
send me written notice that I do not qualify for the Offer.""o' After
Wigod carefully followed the TPP instructions and sent in the first of
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1117.
100. Id.
101. Bourdelais v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2:10CV670-HEH, (E.D. Va. Apr. 1,
2011) (citing Winn v. Chase Mortgage Servs., No. 2:10cv395, 2010,U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143041, at
*10 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2010) ("Plaintiff does not have a private right of action under HAMP"));
see, e.g., Pennington v. PNC Mortgage, No. 2:10cv361, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143157, at *11
(E.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2010) (recognizing that Congress did not intend to "create a private right of
action against participating servicers" and holding that "Plaintiffs do not have a private right of
action to enforce applicable HAMP regulations"); Hoffman v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 10-2171
SI, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70455, at *14-15 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2010) (holding that HAMP does
not provide a private right of action against lenders); Simon v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 10-cv-
00300-GMN-LRL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63480, at *26-27 (D. Nev. June 23, 2010) (dismissing
claim because HAMP "does not provide borrowers with a private cause of action against lenders
for failing to consider their application for loan modification, or even to modify an eligible loan");
Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 3: 10-cv-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61489, at * 16
(D. Ariz. June 21, 2010) ("Plaintiff is precluded from asserting a private cause of action under
HAMP, even disguised as a breach of contract claim. . . ."); Aleem v. Bank of Am., N.A., No.
EDCV 09-01812-VAP (RZx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11944, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010).
102. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 547 (7th Cir. 2012).
103. Id. at 558.
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four reduced mortgage payments, Wells Fargo executed the TPP Agree-
ment in early June 2009. The TTP was effective from July 1, 2009 to
November 1, 2009. The agreement provided that if Wigod complied
with the trial period and if her representations were accurate, "the
Lender will provide [her] with a [permanent] Loan Modification Agree-
ment."" After four months of timely mortgage payments, Wigod
believed that a loan modification was in sight. However, Wigod was
denied her modification without any reasonable explanation. Wigod
continued to make the reduced payments even after the TPP had expired,
as she continued to pursue a loan modification, but the monthly notices
threatening foreclosure proved too much to bear. 105
Wigod sued Wells Fargo on seven counts: (1) breach of contract,
(2) promissory estoppel, (3) breach of the Servicer Participation Agree-
ment, (4) negligent hiring and supervision, (5) fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion or concealment, (6) negligent misrepresentation or concealment,
and (7) Illinois' Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice
Act.106 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois dismissed Wigod's complaint on premises similar to Miller v.
Chase Home Financing, LLC: Because HAMP did not entitle borrowers
to a private right of action, any claims against the mortgager that found
its basis in HAMP terms or procedures were foreclosed.' Additionally,
the court dismissed Wigod's Illinois Consumer Fraud count because of
her inability to establish Wells Fargo's intent to deceive. The court rea-
soned that "if Wells Fargo did not want to permanently modify its bor-
rowers' mortgages, it would not have chosen to voluntarily participate in
the government's modification program[,]" and thus, it would be
implausible to suggest that Wells Fargo intended to deceive Wigod. 08
The Seventh Circuit disagreed. In its seventy-five-page opinion by
Judge Hamilton, the court thoroughly analyzed whether HAMP's foun-
dation in federal law displaces Wigod's state-law claims.1 09 The Seventh
Circuit approached the question of whether a borrower can redress
HAMP claims from a completely different angle than its Eleventh Cir-
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 559.
107. "[A]s was the case with Wigod's breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and negligent
hiring and supervision claims, her concealment claims are premised on Wells Fargo's obligations
as a HAMP servicer and, therefore, HAMP provides her with no private right of action to enforce
those claims." Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10 CV 2348, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7314,
at 22 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2011), vacated, 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Miller v. Chase
Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 2012).
108. See Wigod, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7314, at 24-25.
109. See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 559.
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cuit counterpart. While it agreed that no private right of action exists,110
the court stated that the lack of a private right of action does not fore-
close the possibility of state-law claims, even if such claims are rooted
in federal law."'
In response, Wells Fargo attempted to reinforce its "end-run the-
ory" that "[i]f Congress had intended courts to be adjudicating whether a
borrower qualified for a loan modification under [the 2008 Act] or
HAMP, it would have [expressly] provided a private right of action." 1 2
The Seventh Circuit stated that such a view incorrectly entangles two
distinct lines of reasoning: one involving a federal private right of action
and the other regarding federal preemption of state law." 3 As Judge
Hamilton perceptively stated:
The issue here, however, is not whether federal law itself provides
private remedies, but whether it displaces remedies otherwise avail-
able under state law. The absence of a private right of action from a
federal statute provides no reason to dismiss a claim under a state-law
just because it refers to or incorporates some element of the federal
law." 4
He then compared this statute to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). Like HAMP, FIFRA does not provide
a federal private right of action."' The United States Supreme Court in
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC held that, although Congress did not
provide a federal remedy to those affected by a manufacturer's violation
of FIFRA's labeling requirements, it did not preclude states from pro-
viding remedies."' To find otherwise would require the court to adopt
the view that when Congress provides no remedies under federal law,
the states are equally unable to assist their constituents-leaving those
affected utterly helpless.
Wells Fargo contended that state-law remedies could not exist
because they would conflict with federal law and would thus be pre-
empted. Its argument was twofold: By entertaining Wigod's state-law
claims, the court would (1) "substantially interfere with Wells Fargo's
ability to service residential mortgage loans" in accordance with its reg-
ulations forcing Wells Fargo to create new customer service standards,
and (2) "frustrate Congressional objectives in enacting [the 2008 Act]
110. Id. at 575.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 581 (internal quotations omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 448 (2005).
116. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 547 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Bates, 544
U.S. at 448 (2005)).
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. . . to stabilize the economy and provide a program to mitigate 'avoid-
able' foreclosures.""' The Seventh Circuit found these arguments
unpersuasive. The court rejected the possibility that hearing Wigod's
claims would conflict with Wells Fargo's regulations especially where
"the state-law duty allegedly breached is imported from and delimited
by federal standards established in HAMP's program guidelines."" 9
Moreover, the court found it unlikely that Congress would simply under-
mine state sovereignty by eliminating state-law causes of action.120 In
the court's opinion, such a view would oppose the Department of the
Treasury's HAMP directives, which require servicers to implement
HAMP in compliance with state common law and statutes. 12 1 The court
concluded that "[federal law does not displace Wigod's state-law
claims."122
What does Wigod v. Wells Fargo mean for the future of HAMP
loan modifications? In less than one year, over a hundred cases have
cited the Wigod decision.123 Eighteen cases have followed the Wigod
holding, allowing for state-law remedies to apply independently of a
HAMP ban on private rights of action.124 District courts in the Third,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have approved of the
Wigod decision.12 5 Furthermore, three state courts have followed
117. Id. at 578.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 579.
120. Id. at 580.
121. Id. (citing HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE 09-
01, at 12 (2009) ("Each servicer ... must be aware of, and in full compliance with, all federal,
state, and local laws (including statutes, regulations, ordinances, administrative rules and orders
that have the effect of law, and judicial rulings and opinions) . . . .")).
122. Id. at 575. Wells Fargo also argued that Wigod's state law claims were preempted
because federal law entirely occupies the field of loan regulation through the passage of the Home
Owners Loan Act of 1933. Id. The court discarded the field preemption argument as conflicting
with the saving clause of 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) and previous court holdings. Id.
123. See, e.g., Casey v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Ass'n, No. H-11-3830, 2012 WL 1425138
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2012); Gomez v. Bank of Am., N.A., 3:11-CV-01253-SI, 2012 WL 929790
(D. Or. Mar. 19, 2012); Velasquez v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, CIV. S-12-0433 LKK/CKD PS,
2012 WL 913705 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2012).
124. See infra, notes 144-45.
125. See, e.g., Baginski v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., No. 11 C 6999, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 169754 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2012); Ne. Series of Lockton Cos., LLC v. Bachrach, No. 12 C
1695, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158090 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2012); Fletcher v. OneWest Bank, FSB,
No. 10-cv-4682, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151541 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2012), Second Amendment
Arms v. City of Chicago, 10-cv-4257, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136645 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2012);
Purepecha Enters. v. El Matador Spices & Dry Chiles, No. 11 C 2569, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120499 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2012); Novogroder Cos., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 2:10-CV-
193 RM, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118785 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 21, 2012); Pool v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. I 1-cv-01066-LTB-KLM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112549 (D. Col. Aug. 10, 2012); Avevedo
v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 11 C 4877, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106461 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2012); Smith
v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., No., 3:12-cv-00616-DRH-SCW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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Wigod.126 This illustrates a pattern that more and more courts are slowly
edging away from the rigid view in Miller v. Chase Home Financing in
which homeowners must prove lending violations with complete auton-
omy from HAMP-a near impossible task.
E. Is the Trial Period Plan a Contract?
The Seventh Circuit's finding that alleged HAMP violations under
state law could exist independently from any claims under federal statu-
tory law opened Pandora's box. Courts now have to deal with even more
complex legal issues, the most significant of which is whether the Trial
Period Plan constitutes a contract.
1. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT FINDS A CONTRACT
By finding Wigod's state-law claims as separate from the blanket
ban on private rights of action, the court was able to confront its second
issue: whether Wigod's complaint could survive a motion to dismiss.127
Wigod adequately pled viable claims under Illinois law on four notable
counts: (1) breach-of-contract, (2) promissory estoppel, (3) fraudulent
representation, and (4) Illinois' Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practice Act. 1 2 8
The Seventh Circuit examined whether Wigod's breach-of-contract
cause of action could survive a motion to dismiss. 1 29 Notably, the court
found that the Trial Period Plan constituted a contract.13 0 The court read
the TPP as a unilateral offer-Wells Fargo promised Wigod that it
would give her a permanent loan modification as long as she per-
formed.13 ' Her required performance consisted of the payments of the
103646 (S.D. Ill. July 25, 2012); Martinek v. Diaz, No. 11 C 7190, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100275
(N.D. Ill. July 18, 2012); Tubalinal v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. 11 C 04104, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99593 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2012); Cave v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., No. 11-4586,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75276 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2012); Brady v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No
1:11 -CV-838, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72218 (W.D. Mich. May 24, 2012); Sutcliffe v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., No. C- 1l-06595 JCS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65274 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2012); Soin v.
Fannie Mae, No. Civ. 2:12-634 WBS EFB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51824 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12,
2012); Gutierrez v. PNC Mortg., No. 10cv01770 AJB (RRR), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41890 (S.D.
Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).
126. See Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012);
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Williford, No. 09L-07-295 MJB, 2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 382 (Del.
Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2012); Healey v. Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 11 CV 3340, 2012 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.
Dec. LEXIS 165 (Pa. Cnty. Ct. 2012).
127. See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 559.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 566.
130. Id. at 560-66.
131. Id. at 562.
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reduced mortgage amounts and the validity of her representations. 132 By
doing so, "[a] reasonable person in Wigod's position would read the
TPP as a definite offer to provide a permanent modification that she
could accept so long as she satisfied the conditions."133
The court then contemplated whether there was consideration. 134
Sufficient consideration was found based on the TPP alone.' 35 "By sign-
ing [the TPP], Wigod agreed to open new escrow accounts, to undergo
credit counseling (if asked), and to provide and vouch for the truth of her
financial information."l 36 These legal detriments were in addition to the
monetary obligation she already owed the bank through her original
mortgage. 137
Finally, Wells Fargo argued that without the exact terms of the per-
manent loan modification, the contract was unenforceable. 3 1 The court
did not think this theory was meritorious: "a contract with open terms
can be enforced . . . even though the determination is left to one of the
contracting parties, if he is required to make it 'in good faith' in accor-
dance with some existing standard or with facts capable of objective
proof."' 39 Thus, Wells Fargo's discretion to modify the permanent loan
terms was limited by the HAMP guidelines and good faith. 40
The most interesting part of the court's ruling on Wells Fargo's
motion to dismiss is that the court seemed to have already decided that
an enforceable contract existed between Wigod and Wells Fargo.' 4 '
While a court can allow a "plaintiff the benefit of imagination, so long
as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint[,]"l 42 the Seventh
Circuit seemed to go further than merely stating that Wigod had ade-
quately pled a facially plausible claim under Illinois law.14 3 The court
seemed to acknowledge this dilemma when it said:
We must assume at the pleadings stage that Wigod met each of the
TPP's conditions, and it is undisputed that Wells Fargo offered no
permanent modification at all. [However,] [t]he terms of the TPP are
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 563-64.
135. Id. at 564.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 564-65 (citing I ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAcTS § 95, 402 (1960)
(internal quotations omitted)).
140. Id. at 565.
141. "[Wells Fargo] was certainly required to offer some sort of good-faith permanent
modification to Wigod consistent with HAMP guidelines." Id.
142. See Wigod, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7314, 24-25 (quoting Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2009)).
143. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
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clear and definite enough to support Wigod's breach of contract the-
ory . . . . Wigod's complaint sufficiently pled each element of a
breach of contract claim under Illinois law.'"
2. WIGOD's STRENGTH IS TESTED
While the Seventh Circuit has revolutionized the way in which
courts approach HAMP cases, the facts of Wigod make it easy for courts
to distinguish it. Rummell v. Vantium Capital, Inc. provides a good
example.' In 2009, the Rummells attempted to attain a loan modifica-
tion from CitiMortgage and were placed on a Trial Period Plan.14 6 The
wording of the TPP was much like the wording found in Wigod.14 7 The
fatal difference for the Rummells, as the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan emphasized, was that the bank did not
countersign the TPP as it had in Wigod.148 "[B]ecause Defendant
CitiMortgage did not countersign the 2009 TPP and did not return a
signed copy to Plaintiffs, there was no offer, and there was no binding
contract.""9 Other federal district courts and state courts have also dis-
tinguished the strength of Wigod on similar grounds.' Thus, it appears
144. See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 565. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit found that Wigod had met
pleading requirements for a cause of action under promissory estoppel through her assertions that
she detrimentally relied on Wells Fargo's promise of a permanent loan modification. Id. at 566.
The court also found her fraudulent misrepresentation claim actionable based on Wigod's
allegations that "Wells Fargo made and broke promises of permanent modifications to her and to
thousands of other potential class members as well." Id. at 571. Wigod's last triumph was under
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act-a state consumer action. Id.
at 574-76.
145. No. 12-10952, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91254 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 2012).
146. See id. at *1.
147. The TPP provides that: If I [Plaintiff] am in compliance with this Trial Period Plan
(the "Plan") and my representations in Section I continue to be true in all material
respects, then the servicer will provide me with a Home Affordable Modification
Agreement ("Modification Agreement") as set forth in Section 3, that would amend
and supplement (1) the Mortgage on the property, and (2) the Note secured by the
Mortgage . . . . If I have not already done so, I am providing confirmation of the
reasons I cannot afford my mortgage payment and documents to permit verification
of all of my income . .. to determine whether I qualify for the offer described in this
Plan (the "Offer"). I understand that after I sign and return two copies of this Plan
to the Lender, the Lender will send me a signed copy of this Plan if I qualify for the
Offer or will send me written notice that I do not qualify for the Offer. This Plan will
not take effect unless and until both I and the Lender sign it and Lender provides me
with a copy of this Plan with the Lender's signature.
Id. at *1-2. But see Wigod, 673 F.3d at 558 ("If I am in compliance with this Loan Trial Period
and my representations in Section I continue to be true in all material respects, then the Lender
will provide me with a [permanent] Loan Modification Agreement.") (internal citation omitted).
148. See Rummell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91254, at *7.
149. Id.
150. See Trautman v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, A12-0300, 2012 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 777,
at 10-11 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2012) ("Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., upon which
appellant relies, is distinguishable . . . . The question of whether Minnesota courts would render
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that the Wigod decision only further incentivized banks to change their
TPP practices in order to avoid any legal repercussions down the road.
Moreover, other circuit courts have disagreed with the Seventh Cir-
cuit's breach-of-contract finding.' 1 In Gordon v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Rochelle
Gordon's breach-of-contract theory could not survive a motion to dis-
miss.152 Gordon signed a forbearance agreement with her bank, Chase,
which resulted in a reduction of her monthly mortgage payments.' She
claimed she did so with Chase's assurances that this would result in a
HAMP permanent loan modification.' 5 4 However, as the Fifth Circuit
stated, a forbearance agreement is not related to HAMP; under Gordon's
forbearance agreement she would pay reduced payments for four months
and would then resume with her regular payments.' 5 5 She later applied
for a loan modification, but received inconsistent information regarding
the status of her application. 156 Gordon sued for breach of contract,
alleging that the "communications between herself and Chase 'ripened
into a valid contract' when Chase offered to modify her loan provided
that she supply certain documents, and she accepted Chase's offer by
providing those documents."15 7
The Fifth Circuit rejected this theory because of the Statute of
Frauds. The Statute of Frauds is "designed to prevent fraud and perjury
by requiring certain contracts be in writing and signed by the party to be
the same result as did Wigod in a case where the lender has executed the TPP is not before us.");
Clay v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., No. E2011-01503-COA-R9-CV, 2012 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 417, at 17 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2012) ("Wigod's finding that homeowners may have
an actionable claim based on TPP agreements is inapplicable to this case, as there has never been
any allegation that Mr. Clay ever entered into a TPP with First Horizon."); Lazo v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., No. C 12-00762 LB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69979, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2012) ("The
court finds this reasoning persuasive in the HAMP context, but, at least on the record before it, it
does not appear to apply to the context here. The TPP makes no reference to HAMP, and both
Plaintiffs and BANA suggest that the TPP does not involve HAMP or its guidelines."); Bohnhoff
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-3408(DSD/JSM), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55533, at 2 (D.
Minn. Apr. 20, 2012) ("[Elven if the court were to find Wigod persuasive, the cases are factually
dissimilar. In Wigod, TPP payments were 'timely made' and '[o]n the pleadings, [the court]
assume[d] that she complied with all other obligations under the TPP.' Bohnhoff, however,
'discontinued TPP payments' prior to Wells Fargo approving her for a loan modification.")
(citation omitted).
151. See No. 12-20323, 2013 WL 49587 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 2013).
152. Id. at *1.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at *2 ("One Chase representative told Gordon that Chase would send final papers for
her to sign 'any day from now,' but Gordon was unable to get in touch with the representative
following that conversation. Gordon alleges that she was alternately told that her home would be
foreclosed on, but also that she would be considered for a loan modification.").
157. Id. at *3.
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charged.""' Texas law governed Gordon's alleged contract with
Chase."' Under Texas law, a contract must be in writing and signed by
the party that is to be bound in order for it to be enforceable.160 Because
Gordon was only verbally assured that she would receive a loan modifi-
cation, her alleged contractual loan modification was unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds. 161 Therefore, she did not plead sufficient
facts to survive a motion to dismiss.16 2
The facts presented in the Gordon decision allow for an easy analy-
sis under the Statute of Frauds because Gordon did not have a written
document acknowledging the loan modification or a signature on behalf
of Chase.' But this analysis can also be applied to future TPP argu-
ments: Even if the language of the TPP provides the purported terms of
the contract, without a signature the alleged "contract" is unenforce-
able. 6" This occurred in another Fifth Circuit decision, Pennington v.
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. 6 The Pennington Court held that the TPP did
not constitute a contract because "[t]he lack of a signature from the bank
indicates that it did not intend to be bound by the Modification
Agreement."1 66
The courts' ability to easily distinguish the Wigod decision as
merely persuasive authority and as factually dissimilar leaves homeown-
ers in the same position as before: HAMP hell. It also incentivizes mort-
gagors and servicers to avoid providing any concrete contractual
language in the Trial Period Plan as a means to escape any legal reper-
cussions down the road. Finally, the fate of the Wigod case is still
unclear. The Seventh Circuit merely answered the question of whether
her allegations could survive a motion to dismiss, not whether she could
monetarily recover from the bank's alleged breach of the TPP.'67 Only
time and litigation will reveal the outcome of that decision.
158. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1450 (8th ed. 2004); see also U.C.C. § 2-201 (2012).
159. See Gordon, 2013 WL 49587, at *4.
160. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.02(b) (West 2011).
161. See Gordon, 2013 WL 49587, at *4.
162. Id. at *5.
163. Id. at *4.
164. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 158.
165. 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 20605 (5th Cir. Oct. 3, 2012).
166. Id. at *17.
167. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 559 (7th Cir. 2012). A recent case
from the Supreme Court of Nevada addressed what remedies a homeowner could receive after a
finding of bad faith on behalf of the bank; in that case, the court found that the homeowner could
receive only attorneys' fees, and was not entitled to an automatic loan modification or his home.
See Jacinto v. PennyMac Corp., 300 P.3d 724, 726 (Nev. 2013). Jacinto reveals another issue
which will likely reveal itself in future HAMP cases: even after a finding of bank duplicity, will
homeowners even be entitled to their houses as an adequate remedy at law?
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F. Consumer Protection Actions Show Mixed Success
A number of federal and state consumer protection actions have
arisen over HAMP loan modification violations.168 The results have
been mixed.169 Actions under the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA") have generally been rejected by district courts across
the United States."'o Under the FDCPA, "[a] debt collector may not use
unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any
debt.""' Eligible HAMP borrowers have sued under the FDCPA, alleg-
ing false, deceptive, and misleading banking practices with regard to the
borrowers' foreclosure proceedings.' 72 District courts have almost uni-
formly rejected FDCPA claims" in the HAMP context for two reasons.
First, lenders and their employees"' are not considered "debt col-
lectors" under the definition of the FDCPA. "A 'debt collector' under
168. See, e.g., Cave v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 11-4586, 2012 WL 1957588, at *9-11
(E.D. Pa. May 30, 2012). In Cave, the borrower filed a complaint against his mortgagor under the
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, Pennsylvania Fair Credit
Extension Uniformity Act, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act because the mortgagor 1)
"misrepresent[ed] to them the status of their loan modification application and inform[ed] them to
continue to make modified payments despite having already determined that they did not qualify
under HAMP; 2) charg[ed] late fees during the time period when Plaintiffs made the lower
payments; and 3) fail[ed] to provide the Commonwealth with the information needed for Plaintiffs
to get a HAMP loan." Id.
169. Compare Blackwood v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-10483-JGD, 2011 WL 1561024
(D. Mass. Apr. 22, 2011) (allowing the borrower's cause of action under Massachusetts's Chapter
93A, which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices in trade or commerce, to survive a motion to
dismiss) with Kozaryn v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 100, 103 (D. Mass. 2011)
(finding borrower's allegations under Chapter 93A defective and thus unable to survive a motion
to dismiss).
170. See, e.g., Brock v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, No. 4:11 -CV-21 I-A, 2012 WL 620550 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 24, 2012) (granting motion for summary judgment in favor of defendant-bank over
plaintiff-borrower's Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim); Moore v. Mortgage Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.N.H. 2012) (granting defendant-bank's motion to
dismiss over plaintiff-borrower's Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim); Cave, 2012
WL 1957588, at *9-11 (same); Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (same); Thomas v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 811 F. Supp. 2d 781 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (same).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f) (2012).
172. See, e.g., Thomas v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 811 F. Supp. 2d 781, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
173. But see Patrick v. Teays Valley Trustees, LLC, No. 3:12-CV-39, 2012 WL 5993163, at
*12 (N.D. W. Va. Nov. 30, 2012) (finding that the borrowers had alleged sufficient facts for their
FDCPA claim to survive a motion to dismiss because the bank's purported attorney was not
licensed to practice law in West Virginia).
174. Homeowners have also attempted to sue the bank's lawyers through the FDCPA.
Compare Speleos v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 755 F. Supp. 2d 304, 331-33 (D. Mass.
Dec. 14, 2010) (finding FDCPA inapplicable to lender's attorneys because the law firm was "not
collecting a debt but rather enforcing a security interest") with Moore, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 124-25
(holding that FDCPA may be applicable to the bank's attorneys because "it is evident that the
purpose of Harmon's letter was not only to enforce a security interest, but also to attempt to
collect the underlying loan debt.").
HAMPERED HOPES FOR HOMEOWNERS
the statute means anyone who collects debts owed [to] . . . another and
excludes collecting a debt to the extent the collection 'concerns a debt
which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.' "175
As applied in Thomas v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., the plaintiff-bor-
rower's facts rendered his FDCPA claims irrelevant:
With regards to Thomas, Chase is attempting to collect the debt on its
own behalf. Moreover, the [Complaint] does not allege that the loans
of the named plaintiffs were in default at the time Chase "obtained"
those loans. As a result, Chase is excluded from the definition of
"debt collector" under the statute.17 6
Thus, unless the bank was acting as a loan servicer on behalf of an
investor and the debt was in default when the bank acquired the loan,
FDCPA does not apply to the borrower.177
The other reason district courts almost uniformly reject FDCPA
with regard to HAMP transactions is that the borrower's allegations do
not constitute unfair or deceptive practices. 7 In Lucia v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., the plaintiffs contended that Wells Fargo misled borrowers
into believing that the borrowers would be entitled to a permanent loan
modification if they successfully completed the Trial Period Plan.179 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
rejected this claim because the wording in the TPP would not lead even
the "least sophisticated debtor" to believe that successful completion of
the trial period would result in a permanent loan modification.18 0
Because the Lucia Court determined that Wells Fargo did not commit
any violations of the FDCPA, Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss was
175. Thomas, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 801. See also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692(6)(F) (West 2012).
176. Thomas, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 801-02.
177. While this may seem atypical, selling loans and servicing rights are not uncommon. In
2012, the Federal Housing Association established a new program, known as the Distressed Asset
Stabilization Program. This program is intended to sell defaulted loans to investors at a discounted
price in order to avoid an excess of defaulted loans and mortgages. See Asset Sales, U.S. DEP'T OF
HouSING AND URBAN DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program offices/housing/
comp/asset/hsgloan (last updated Feb. 5. 2013). See also Amy Tobik, Major Mortgage Lender
Begins Selling Loans in Default, DEBT.ORG (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.debt.org/2012/09/21/
major-mortgage-lender-begins-selling-loans-default/. Additionally, Bank of America recently sold
its servicing rights on loans worth about $306 billion as part of a settlement with Fannie Mae over
claims made on troubled mortgages, mainly associated with Countrywide Financial, the lending
group that Bank of America purchased in 2008. See Bill Fay, Bank of America to Pay $10B to
Fannie Mae to Settle Claims, DEBT.ORG (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.debt.org/2013/01/07/bank-of-
america-to-pay-lOb-fannie-mael.
178. See, e.g., Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1071-72 (N.D. Cal.
2011).
179. Id.
180. "The TPP Contract operative at the time states that the TPP 'is not a modification of the
Loan Documents' and that 'the Lender will not be obligated or bound to make any modification of
the Loan Documents if I fail to meet any one of the requirements under this Plan."' Id. at 1072.
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granted.18 1
While federal consumer protection actions have not had much suc-
cess under HAMP, a number of state consumer protections actions have
survived motions to dismiss. 18 2 The pleading requirements vary under
each state's consumer protection laws. 1 3 Thus, a discussion of each
would be too numerous. However, the relative success of these actions
has prompted two interesting lawsuits out of Nevada and Arizona-two
states with extremely high foreclosure rates. 184 Nevada's Attorney Gen-
eral, Catherine Cortez Masto, filed a class action lawsuit against Bank of
America for engaging in deceptive trade practices against Nevada home-
owners in violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act.18 5
That same day, Arizona's then Attorney General, Terry Goddard, filed a
similar class action against Bank of America under the Arizona Con-
sumer Fraud Statute.18 6 With state actors stepping in to address home-
owners' concerns about HAMP, the absence of a hefty legal bill at the
end of the day may allow for more homeowners to step forward. Unfor-
tunately, this may not mean anything in terms of redressing HAMP
problems.
IV. THE FUTURE OF HAMP
The issue with HAMP grievances, as this article has discussed, is
not the legal system per se, but HAMP itself. HAMP is inherently
ambiguous. It provides no private right of action. The contracts between
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Patrick v. Teays Valley Trs., LLC, No. 3:12-CV-39, 2012 WL 5993163, at
*15-19 (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 30, 2012) (finding sufficient facts alleged a claim under West Virginia
Consumer Credit Protection Act); Stroman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Ga.
2012) (same under Georgia Fair Lending Act); Stovall v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., No. RDB-10-
2836, 2011 WL 4402680 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2011) (same under Maryland Consumer Protection
Act); Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 547 (7th Cir. 2012) (same under the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act); Cave v. Saxon Mortg. Servs.,
Inc., No. 11-4586, 2012 WL 1957588 at *9-11 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2012) (same under
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law). But see Kiper v. BAC Home
Loans Servicing, LP, Nos. H-11-3008, H-11-3363, 2012 WL 3185968 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2012)
(holding that defendants were not "debt collectors" within meaning of Texas Debt Collection
Practices Act); Costigan v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8776 (SAS), 2011 WL 3370397
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2011) (dismissing Plaintiffs claims under New York Deceptive Practice Act
and New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act).
183. See supra note 182.
184. Nevada and Arizona are second and sixth respectively for the highest number of
foreclosures. They join Florida, California, Illinois, and Ohio. See December 2012 Foreclosure
Rate Heat Map, REALTY TRAc, http://www.realtytrac.coml/trendcenter/trend.html (last visited Feb.
7, 2013).
185. See Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012).
186. See Arizona ex rel. Home v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. CV-ll-131-PHX-FJM, 2011
WL 995963 (D. Ariz. Mar. 21, 2011).
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loan servicers and the Federal Government provide too much discretion
and leeway. The Trial Period Plan is nothing more than an agreement to
agree. Regardless of what the homeowners are told by the banks, with-
out this consideration in writing, no enforceable agreement exists. 8 7
The minute the courts find a way to give some teeth to HAMP, the
banks easily adjust their practices to make it even harder to bring a
maintainable lawsuit. And to make matters worse, the Federal Govern-
ment has done little to redress these issues.""'
HAMP's biggest deficiency is that it fails to address the concerns
of the individual homeowner. In the grand scheme of HAMP, one failed
loan modification is not critical. 189 However, to one homeowner, the
loss of his home is incredibly devastating. One way that HAMP can
target individual homeowner concerns is by providing an avenue for
homeowners to timely address their grievances. For example, the Ser-
vice Participation Agreement should specifically state that homeowners
are third-party beneficiaries under HAMP. This will avoid any discrep-
ancies as to whether HAMP eligible borrowers have standing. Addition-
ally, a uniform Trial Period Plan should be distributed by all servicers
and should provide clear wording, with no contradictions, that fulfill-
ment of the Trial Period Plan will ensure a permanent loan modification.
Alternatively, a bank's failure to comply with HAMP guidelines may be
a defense to a foreclosure. Providing a homeowner with the ability to
"challenge the servicer's failure to consider a loan modification before
foreclosure, as they do in court-supervised mediation programs, [will
increase] rates of loan modifications [ ]."190
A non-judicial alternative may provide a more rigorous HAMP
appeals process. The Federal Government has created the HAMP Solu-
187. See Gordon v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 12-20323, 2013 WL 49587, at *4 (5th
Cir. Jan. 3, 2013) (rejecting borrower's claim under breach of contract because the representations
from the bank were not in writing).
188. Almost every official evaluation of HAMP has noted a lack of enforcement by the
Department of the Treasury and its agents. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGREss: APRIL 25, 2012
(2012), available at http:// www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/April_25_.2012_Report-
toCongress.pdf; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES:
DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REVEAL NEED FOR ONGOING REGULATOR OVERSIGHT, GAO- 11-433
(2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/317923.pdf; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL,
MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 64-
832 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg64832/pdf/CHRG-112
shrg64832.pdf.
189. Compare the 1,106,559 permanent HAMP loan modifications granted versus the
1,941,028 HAMP trial period plans that were started from the inception of HAMP in 2009 to
October 2012. See COHEN ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, AT A CROSSROADS:
LESSONS FROM THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 8 (2013), available at http://
www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure-mortgagelloan-mod/hamp-report-2013.pdf.
190. Id. at 8.
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tions Center to address homeowner grievances. However, data have
shown that while the Solutions Center has been helpful in providing
homeowners with a denial notice, it has never proven helpful in getting a
borrower a permanent loan modification.191 Providing greater avenues to
redress homeowner HAMP grievances may allow for greater rights for
homeowners, but it may also create disincentives for loan servicers and
investors to provide more HAMP loan modifications.19 2
Thus, Congress should also consider creating greater incentives for
loan servicers to entice servicers that give greater attention to individual
cases. Modifications, like those under HAMP, require more staff, more
time, and possibly a recognition of losses, either through a principal
write down or an interest rate reduction. 1 93 Diane Thompson argues that
the recognition of losses can reduce the monthly servicing fee or the loss
of mortgage servicing rights.' 94 Without adequate training, explicit man-
dates, and greater financial incentives, loan servicers will likely continue
to favor foreclosures and refinancing.' 95
Another route to improve HAMP is to create national loan modifi-
cation servicing standards, which build upon the successes of HAMP,
but also address HAMP's failures.1 96 The National Consumer Law
Center envisions such standards to "mandate robust disclosure and trans-
parency throughout the loan modification process and rigorous compli-
ance mechanisms"; to provide all eligible homeowners with permanent
loan modifications; to require mandatory, not discretionary, loan modifi-
cations; to allow homeowners to exercise enforcement options; and to
mandate governmental oversight.' Such a comprehensive reform
would likely make great strides for the housing market. However, like
non-judicial and judicial enforcement mechanisms, this proposed solu-
191. CONNECTIcUr FAIR HOUSING CENTER, REPORT ON THE EFFICACY OF THE HAMP
SOLUTION CENTER 1-2. (2012).
192. "The financial compensation and constraints imposed on and chosen by servicers
generally lead servicers to prefer refinancing, foreclosures, and short-term repayment plans to
modifications." Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives
Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REv. 755, 838 (2011).
193. Id. at 839.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 840.
196. See, e.g., Regulation of Mortgage Servicing Act of 2011, S. 967, 112th Cong. (2011);
Preserving Homes and Communities Act of 2011, H.R. 1477, 112th Cong. (2011); Preserving
Homes and Communities Act of 2011, S. 489, 112th Cong. (2011); Foreclosure Fraud and
Homeowner Abuse Prevention Act of 2011, H.R. 1783, 112th Cong. (2011); Foreclosure Fraud
and Homeowner Abuse Prevention Act of 2011, S. 824, 112th Cong. (2011); Foreclosure
Prevention and Sound Mortgage Servicing Act of 2011, H.R. 1567, 112th Cong. (2011);
Regulation of Mortgage Servicing Act of 2012, H.R. 3789, 112th Cong. (2012); Mandatory
Foreclosure Mediation Act, H.R. 3595, 112th Cong. (2011).
197. COHEN ET AL., supra note 190, at 8.
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tion may cause banks to refuse to participate in HAMP modifications
entirely.
The future of HAMP will be up for debate in December 2015."'
Whether it will continue, be reformed, or be completely scrapped will
likely rest on the existing state of the housing market. Regardless of
what happens to HAMP, the debate should rest not only on HAMP's
progress and deficiencies, but on whom HAMP was intended to help:
the homeowners. Lawmakers should think about the De La Torres fam-
ily in California whose dream of homeownership made it turn to HAMP
for help,'19 or Johnson Sendolo who lost his home because the bank
inexplicably denied his loan modification request. 2 " As Reubin Askew
once said, "[w]e must stop talking about the American dream and start
listening to the dreams of Americans."201
198. HAMP will expire on December 31, 2015. The presence of an expiration date does not
necessarily determine whether HAMP will end. HAMP was originally set to expire on December
31, 2013, but was instead reformed and extended an extra two years. See Press Release, Obama
Administration Extends Application Deadline for the Making Home Affordable Program, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY (May 30, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/j11959.aspx.
199. See supra p. 2 and note 2.
200. See supra p. 8 and note 40.
201. Reubin O'D. Askew, The Dreams of Americans, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Aug. 1,
1972, at 612, 614.
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